Lifecycle consistent estimation of effect of taxes on female labor supply in the US: evidence from panel data by Anil Kumar
 
      
Lifecycle-Consistent Female Labor Supply with Nonlinear Taxes: 
Evidence from Unobserved Effects Panel Data Models with Censoring, 
Selection and Endogeneity 
 
Anil Kumar* 
Senior Research Economist and Advisor 
Research Department 






This paper uses the PSID from 1979-2007 to estimate lifecycle-consistent labor supply 
elasticities of U.S. females with nonlinear taxes, in a two-stage budgeting framework. The 
paper is the first to estimate U.S. female labor supply models using semiparametric 
unobserved effects panel data methods with censoring, selection and endogeneity. The paper 
finds that female labor supply elasticities, particularly on the intensive margin, are sensitive 
to both the method used to account for unobserved effects and to economic assumptions 
regarding lifecycle behavior. The estimated lifecycle-consistent uncompensated wage 
elasticity for U.S. females from the correlated random effects model with instrumental 
variables is 0.56 on the extensive margin and 0.31 on the intensive margin, implying an 
overall wage elasticity of 0.87. In comparison, fixed effects models yield an overall wage 
elasticity of 0.77, substantially smaller than pooled panel models.  
 
Keywords: Taxes and Female Labor supply, Lifecycle labor Supply, Fixed Effects models 
with censoring, selection, and endogeneity  
 
JEL Numbers: J22, H24, C14, C23, C24  
 
*Senior Research Economist and Advisor, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Previous 
versions if this paper were also circulated under two different titles: (1) “Lifecycle Consistent Estmiation of 
Female Labor Supply” and (2) “Taxes, Deadweight Loss and Intertemporal Labor Supply: Evidence from 
Panel Data”.The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.  I am grateful to Gary Engelhardt for his 
constant encouragement and generous support during this research. I thank Soren Blomquist, Monica Singhal, 
Tom Kniesner, Dan Black, Duke Kao, Jeffrey Kubik, Jan Ondrich and seminar participants at Syracuse 
University, Miami University, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, RAND Corporation and Institute of Social 
Research, University of Michigan, conference participants at the 99
th Annual Conference on Taxation in 
Boston, and the 13
th International Panel Data Conference in Cambridge, England for helpful discussions and 
insightful comments on previous versions.  I am fully responsible for any errors.   
 
2
1.   Introduction 
 
Following a sustained increase since the 1970’s, the recent decline in labor force 
participation of married women has led to concerns that they are opting out of the labor 
force (Juhn and Potter (2006), Macunovich and Pegula (2010)).
1 With looming retirement of 
baby boomers and a projected decline in the overall labor force participation rate, policies 
aimed at stemming the exit of married females from the labor force could soon assume 
added significance. Central to the design of such policies and evaluation of their welfare 
costs is the female labor supply elasticity which remains an active area of research in public 
finance and labor economics. Although there is broad agreement that female labor supply is 
more elastic than male’s, consensus remains elusive on exactly how responsive females are 
to tax and wage changes. More accurate estimates of the female labor supply elasticity are 
also necessary to estimate the impact of fundamental tax reforms, back on the public policy 
agenda due to growing concerns about the long-term sustainability of the U.S. fiscal deficit.  
There is a long literature on taxation and female labor supply but gaps remain. Much 
of the previous literature estimating within-period Marshallian labor supply elasticities for 
U.S. females, incorporating nonlinear taxes, has primarily estimated static models assuming 
myopic behavior and perfectly constrained capital markets.
2 Estimates of within-period 
elasticities from purely static models are not lifecycle-consistent and can be inaccurate if 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all references to female labor supply in this paper refers only to married women. 
For recent research on single women, see Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Eissa and Liebman (1996) among 
others. 
2 For example  Hausman (1980),  Hausman (1981), Moffitt (1984),  Eissa (1995), Eissa (1995b), Eissa (1996) , 
Eissa and Hoynes (2004),  Eissa and Hoynes (2005), Triest (1990), Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990),  
van Soest et al. (1990), Heim (2007), Heim (2009), Kumar (2010) .  
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households can transfer assets across periods (Blundell and Macurdy (1999), Blundell and 
Walker (1986)).  
Estimating lifecycle-consistent female labor supply specification also forms a crucial 
first step in the well-known two-stage budgeting framework to recover intertemporal 
preferences if taxes are nonlinear and the intertemporal budget constraint is nonseparable. 
Presence of nonlinear taxes can invalidate the widely used  -constant labor supply 
specifications ((Blomquist (1985), Blundell and Macurdy (1999), Ziliak and Kniesner 
(1999)), while econometric specifications consistent with two stage budgeting remain valid 
and can be used to estimate life-cycle consistent within-period female labor supply 
following which intertemporal preference parameters can be recovered. Blundell and Walker 
(1986), Blundell et al. (1993), Blundell et al. (1998)  used two-stage budgeting 
specifications to estimate lifecycle-consistent elasticities for British females. Aronsson and 
Wikström (1994) estimated lifecycle-consistent of family labor supply with nonlinear taxes 
using Swedish cross section data. Ziliak and Kniesner (1999)  used the PSID to estimate 
lifecycle-consistent labor supply elasticities in the presence of nonlinear taxes for a sample 
of U.S. men. Papers that estimated lifecycle labor supply models for U.S. females, in 
general, ignored complications caused by nonlinear taxation.
3   Studies that accounted 
carefully for nonlinear taxes, did not estimate lifecycle-consistent two-stage budgeting 
specifications.  
                                                 
3Heckman and Macurdy (1980) and Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) estimated intertemporal elasticities for US 
females using a lifecycle model but ignored taxation. Other papers that have estimated lifecycle models for 
U.S. females ignoring taxes include Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Jakubson (1988), Johnson and Pencavel 
(1984), Lilja (1986), Lundberg (1988), Zabel (1997)  also estimated  -constant female labor supply models 
without taxes.  
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In estimating static specifications, previous literature on taxes and female labor 
supply in the U.S. used primarily cross-sectional rather than panel data.
4 It is difficult to 
account comprehensively for unobserved heterogeneity in female labor supply behavior 
using cross-section data.
5  Estimating unobserved effects models of female labor supply with 
censoring and selection, has additional challenges, as simple fixed effects models do not 
work due to incidental parameters problems; first differencing to remove the fixed effects is 
not possible since the model is nonlinear (Neyman and Scott (1948)).  
This paper makes two contributions to the existing body of work on female labor 
supply. First, it uses the PSID  from 1979-2007 to estimate within-period lifecycle consistent 
labor supply elasticities of US females, in the presence of nonlinear taxation, in a two-stage 
budgeting framework, in the spirit of papers such as Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) for US 
males and (R Blundell et al., 1993) for British females.
6 Second, the paper is the first to 
estimate U.S. female labor supply models employing a variety of panel data estimation 
methods including semiparametric fixed effects panel data methods with censoring, 
selection and endogeneity, combining econometric approaches in Honoré (1992), 
                                                 
4Although panel data facilitates life-cycle consistent estimation, it is by no means absolutely necessary. Such 
specifications can be estimated even using cross-section data (see MaCurdy (1983), Blundell and Walker 
(1986)). 
5Among recent papers on female labor supply elasticity, Devereux (2004) used repeated cross-section data 
from the Census IPUMS and used a grouping strategy to estimate static specifications of female labor supply 
with group fixed effects. Blau and Kahn (2007) and Heim (2007), who find compelling evidence that female 
labor supply elasticities are in a long term decline and converging towards men, estimated static models using 
a time series of cross-section data from the CPS. Gelber and Mitchell (2011) used fixed effects panel data 
model to estimate the hours elasticity with respect to net-of-tax-rate for single women of 0.53 using PSID 
1975-2004. 
6 In line with most other studies on female labor supply with nonlinear taxes, this paper estimates a secondary 
earners female labor supply model, in a unitary rather than collective framework, where wives, being 
secondary earners, make labor supply decisions conditional on husbands having made their labor supply 
choices. See Chiappori (1988), Fortin and Lacroix (1997),  Apps and Rees (1997),  Blundell et al. (2007) , 
Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008), Donni (2003), among others, for collective models of labor supply.    
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Kyriazidou (1997), Blundell and Powell (2007), Blundell and Powell (2004), (Charlier et al., 
2001), Papke and Wooldridge (2008), Wooldridge (2009) and Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2010).  
In many respects this paper is similar in spirit to three other papers which carefully 
examined the sensitivity of female labor supply estimates to a variety of different 
specifications: Mroz (1987), Jakubson (1988), and Zabel (1997). This paper differs from all 
these three papers.  While Mroz (1987) restricted analysis to just 1975 wave of the PSID, 
Jakubson (1988), and Zabel (1997) used panel data from the PSID but estimated  -constant 
random and fixed effects Tobit models without taxes, ignoring the potential bias due to the 
incidental parameters problem as well as complications due to nonlinear taxation.  
There are three primary findings.  First, female labor supply elasticity estimates, 
particularly on the intensive margin, are sensitive to estimating unobserved effects 
specifications. Fixed effects models yield participation wage elasticity of 0.43 compared 
with 0.56 from both simple pooled panel models without unobserved effects and Correlated 
random effects (CRE) specifications.
7 Intensive margin elasticities, however, are more 
sensitive to accounting for unobserved effects; fixed effects models and CRE specifications 
produce much smaller and insignificant hours elasticities than pooled panel models.   
Second, estimates of wage elasticity are somewhat sensitive to the choice of a more 
general lifecycle-consistent framework applicable under nonlinear taxes versus a static 
model, underscoring the need to account for lifecycle factors in female labor supply. In the 
CRE specification with instrumental variables, the estimated lifecycle-consistent wage 
                                                 
7 This is different from the results for single women in Gelber and Mitchell (2011) who found that elasticities 
from fixed effects models were 50% larger than those without fixed effects.  
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elasticity on the extensive margin is 0.56, compared with 0.46 from the static model. On the 
intensive margin, estimated lifecycle-consistent wage elasticity is 0.31 from the CRE 
specification, while the static model yields a much smaller elasticity of 0.13. However, 
given the large standard errors, the estimates are statistically indistinguishable.     
Finally, the paper does not find evidence of significant difference in estimated 
elasticities across lifecycle-consistent models applicable to linear taxes that condition on net 
saving vis-à-vis models consistent with joint nonlinear labor and capital income taxes.
8 
Overall, the results indicate that the choice of econometric specification and economic 
assumptions regarding lifecycle behavior can have implications for the estimated impact of 
tax and transfer policies on female labor supply. The lifecycle-consistent wage elasticity 
from the correlated random effects (CRE) model with instrumental variables is 0.56 on the 
extensive margin and 0.31 on the intensive margin, implying an overall wage elasticity of 
0.87. Fixed effects models yield an overall wage elasticity of 0.77 compared with an 
elasticity of greater than one from pooled panel models.  
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief theoretical framework 
for married female labor supply in the presence of joint non-linear capital and labor income 
taxation, and outlines the reasons for the use of two-stage budgeting.  Section 3 describes the 
econometric specification.  Section 4 provides a brief description of the data and 
construction of the key variables: wage, income, assets and taxes.  Section 5 discusses the 
results.  There is a brief conclusion.  
2.   Theoretical Framework 
                                                 
8 Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) found negative wage elasticity when conditioning on net saving.  
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In the benchmark static model labor supply model with taxes, the consumer 
maximizes the current period utility function with respect to consumption     and hours of 
work     
     ,    ;      (1)
subject to the static budget constraint, 
                          ,    ,     ,  (2)
where   indexes individuals and   indexes time,     is a vector of exogenous taste shifters 
that include other demographic and economic characteristics,      the hourly wage rate,      
the nonlabor income.       ,    ,      is the nonlinear tax function with adjusted gross income 
                       ;          is the capital income from end of period   1  assets       
at an interest rate of    ,     deductions and     the number of exemptions. Consumer’s 
optimization problem yields a labor supply equation as a function of after-tax wage rate      
which equals     1       with  , the marginal tax rate, and virtual income    :
9 
   
         ,    ;     (3)
In the lifecycle model, the consumer chooses consumption and hours of work to 
maximize the expected present discounted value of utility: 
      
 
   
     ,    ;      (4)
subject to the asset accumulation constraint 
       1                                 ,    ,       (5)
where     and       represents assets in period   and   1 , respectively.  
                                                 
9 More specifically                                       where     is the actual tax liability and                 
is what it would have been if the entire earnings were taxed at the marginal tax rate.  
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Notice that the tax function incorporates joint nonlinear taxation of labor and capital 
income. Three points to note about the lifecycle-consistent consumer’s optimization problem 
are: (1) utility is intertemporally separable; (2) within period utility is weakly separable in 
consumption and leisure; (3) due to joint nonlinear taxation of labor and capital income, the 
budget constraint is nonseparable in goods and prices across periods.  
2.1. Nonlinear Taxes Invalidate  -Constant Labor Supply Function  
As shown in Blomquist (1985), if both preferences and the budget constraint are 
intertemporally separable then the only way wages in one period change demand for leisure 
in another is through a wealth effect. If so, a common solution is to estimate  -constant or 
Frisch labor supply functions, where  , the individual specific time invariant marginal utility 
of wealth is a sufficient statistic for information in other periods and can be differenced 
away using fixed effects panel data models Heckman and Macurdy (1980).  
However, when taxes are nonlinear and the budget constraint is nonseparable in 
goods and prices, wage changes in one period can affect labor supply in other periods by 
impacting wages in those periods, in addition to the wealth effect. In other words, labor 
supply in one period is a function of prices in other periods. Blomquist (1985) showed that 
in the presence of nonlinear taxes, the marginal utility of wealth   is no more a sufficient 
statistic and  -constant labor supply function fails to account for the nonseparabilities in the 
budget constraint, but two-stage budgeting remains valid. Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) used 
two-stage budgeting approach to estimate lifecycle-consistent labor supply elasticities for 
US males. Such an approach has not been used to model lifecycle-consistent elasticities for 
US married women. 
2.2. Sufficient Statistics Under Two-Stage Budgeting   
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In a two stage budgeting framework, proposed by Gorman (1959), in the first-stage, 
the consumer allocates total expenditure across periods to equate the marginal utility of 
wealth.  In the second-stage, she takes the allocation of wealth between periods as given, 
and allocates between consumption and hours, like a standard static intratemporal problem, 
conditional on    and     .  In this framework,     contains information on the past 
decisions and  t A  represents the effect of future prices.   
As shown in Blomquist (1985), in a two-stage budgeting framework, in the absence 
of taxes or in the presence of a linear capital income tax that result in time separable budget 
constraint, net saving       1          is a sufficient statistic for incorporating 
information from other periods, where    is the after tax rate of interest.  
Instead, if taxes are nonlinear as they are in the U.S., then    and      can be used 
as sufficient statistics that capture the adjustment in level of assets by the end of the period. 
Alternatively, saving       1         and capital income        can also serve as 
sufficient statistics. Following Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) and using    and      as 
sufficient statistic, lifecycle-consistent labor supply is a function of the after-tax wage rate 
   ,    and virtual lagged asset     
  :
10 
           ,   ,     
  ;      (6)
3.  Estimation and Identification 
                                                 
10Analogous to virtual income    , following Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), the virtual lagged assets are defined 
as     
                                     /   . The reason why this adjustment is made to lagged assets and 
not to current period assets is, as explained in Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), that income on previous period 
assets figure into tax calculations.  
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Writing the desired labor supply in (6) as a latent variable    
 , the baseline lifecycle-
consistent female labor supply specification in a world with nonlinear taxes becomes: 
11  
   
                                
                    (7)
   
   equals actual hours     if      0   and 0 otherwise.     is an individual specific 
unobserved effect,     is a mean zero error term. 
What distinguishes the general lifecycle-consistent specification with nonlinear taxes 
in (7) from more restrictive specifications with a linear capital income tax or from a static 
model without possibility of transfer of assets across periods? If capital income taxes were 
linear or there were no taxes, then virtual net saving could be used instead of     and      
   
in (7).
12 If, on the other hand, the objective is to estimate a static model, virtual income     
replaces     and      
   in (7) above.  
A variety of approaches can be used to estimate the parameters of the labor supply 
equation (7). Some methods account comprehensively for piecewise-linear budget set 
underlying the derivation of the labor supply function (Burtless and Hausman (1978), 
Hausman (1981), Heckman and MaCurdy (1982), Blomquist and Newey (2002), Heim 
(2009), Kumar (2008), Kumar (2010), Liang (2011)). These methods, however, are not 
easily amenable to fixed effects estimation with panel data. Therefore, in line with other 
recent studies on female labor supply elasticities, this paper uses a simpler approach and 
                                                 
11Hereinafter   denotes after-tax wage of workers as well as nonworkers with the nonworker’s missing wages 
replaced by after tax predicted wage    .  
12 To account for nonlinear taxes virtual net saving was calculated as the sum of net saving and a lump sum 
transfer akin to one used for virtual income     i.e.        1                                     .  
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calculates the after-tax wage   by linearizing the budget set at the observed marginal tax 
rate (Hall (1973)) and then treating   as endogenous.
13   
Tobit can be used to estimate (7) if wages for all females were available. Tobit-type 
labor supply equations, however, are based on the premise of a continuous labor supply 
schedule that constrains the parameters of the participation decision and the hours of work 
decision to be identical and will be biased if participation and hours decisions are separate.  
The paper, therefore, also estimates participation elasticities using Probit/Logit models with 
an indicator for labor force participation,     , replacing    
  as the dependent variable in 
(7). Elasticities on the intensive margin are obtained by estimating selection-corrected hours 
equations, restricting the estimation sample to workers. Since Tobit/Probit/Logit model is 
based on the entire sample, imputed wages are required for females out of the labor force.  
3.1 Selection-Corrected Wage Equation to Predict Wages  
Following the previous literature, unobserved wages in the Probit/Logit/Tobit-type 
models are replaced by wage estimated from a selectivity-bias-corrected wage equation.
14 
The two-step Heckman type selection-corrected wage equation can be written as: 
   
                  (8)
                                  (9)
                                                 
13An alternative approach of imputing the effective marginal tax rate from a differentiable smooth budget 
constraint methodology proposed in MaCurdy et al. (1990) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) was also followed 
but the results were similar. 
14Using predicted wages for non-workers is standard in the literature on female labor supply with taxes. The 
primary condition for consistency is consistent estimates of the wage equation parameters Wales and 
Woodland (1980). Some earlier researchers used OLS to estimate the wage equation Hall (1973), Rosen 
(1976)). This strategy has been criticized on grounds of selectivity-bias in the wage equation Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1986); Wales and Woodland (1980). Many other studies use selectivity-bias adjusted wage 
predictions (Hausman (1980b); Bourguignon and Magnac (1990); Colombino and Del Boca (1990); Triest 
(1990);  van Soest et al. (1990).  
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In the first step, a reduced form selection equation for labor force participation (8) is 
estimated as a linear regression on a vector of variables,   , consisting of power series in 
age, education, race, unearned income      and a dummy for the presence children under 
seven years (      7 , for each year, allowing the coefficients to vary by year. In the 
second step, for each year, the wage equation (9) is estimated by regressing log of real wage, 
    on a vector of regressors    consisting of all variables in    except unearned income 
     and       7  - which act as exclusion restrictions- and inverse mills ratio term 
         , obtained from (8). The identifying assumption is, conditional on age, education 
and other demographics,      and        7 are correlated with the labor force participation 
status but conditional on labor force participation, they are uncorrelated with wages. 
3.2 Endogeneity, Instruments and Identification 
Using panel data, this paper uses both cross-sectional and time-series variation in 
wages, assets, and tax rates from 1979-2007 to identify the effect of taxes on labor supply. 
The previous three decades spanned four major tax reforms in ERTA 1981, TRA 1986, 
1993, and the Bush Tax Cuts of 2001. The time-series variation in marginal tax rates 
induced by these reforms helps identify the wage effects as well as the coefficient on virtual 
asset. The cross-sectional variation in after- tax wage, virtual income and assets, however is 
likely to be endogenous for three reasons. 
First, if taxes are progressive, the current period marginal tax rate is endogenous to 
the choice of current period earnings and hours of work.  Second, as noted by Eissa (1995), 
the marginal tax rate is a nonlinear function of income and family size, and may be 
correlated with underlying tastes for work that also may be correlated with income and 
family size. The endogeneity of the marginal tax rate renders key variables, after tax wage,  
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          1       and virtual lagged real net assets,     
  ,  endogenous as they are 
functions of the marginal tax rate,    . And finally, the gross wage     and current period 
assets      themselves may be endogenous as they may be potentially correlated with 
unobserved tastes for work.   
Instrumental Variables 
  This paper accounts for the potential endogeneity of    ,       
  , and     using 
instrumental variables. After-tax real wage is instrumented with after-tax predicted real 
wage,      
         1     
  , where       is the predicted wage from the wage equation (9) and 
   
  is the first-dollar tax rate on household’s earnings.
15  The identifying assumption is that 
the first-dollar tax rate is correlated with the observed marginal tax rate but is otherwise 
uncorrelated with hours of work.
16   
 To further guard against potential endogeneity in contemporaneous values of      
  the 
paper follows Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) in using the second lag of      
   i. e.         
   as 
instrument.
17 Analogously, the second lag of     
                
              
  /   i.e. 
    
    is used as instrument for      
  . With      used to construct the instrument for     , 
      is used as an instrument for current real assets    . In addition to   
       
  ,     
   ,           , the baseline instrument set also includes time dummies, the 
                                                 
15In the literature on nonlinear budget set estimation with taxes using maximum likelihood, gross wage and full 
income are treated as exogenous. However, both of these could be endogenous in a lifecycle model due to 
human capital accumulation factors. Also, first lags are not used as instruments due to potential first order 
serial correlation in the error term. 
16 Other plausible instruments for the tax rate e.g. marginal tax rate on husband’s earnings based on 2000 hours 
a years were also used as instruments. The results were similar. 
17Under the assumption of rational expectations, everything in the information set at time  1  t  and before is 
exogenous. 
  So the twice-lagged value of the gross wage and full income are considered exogenous are valid 
for making instruments.  
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identifying assumption being that aggregate shocks are correlated with hours only through 
the after tax wage and asset variables (MaCurdy (1981); Altonji (1986); Angrist (1991); 
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999)).
18  
4. Data 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) began in 1968, and is a longitudinal 
data on a sample of U.S. individuals and their family units, collected annually from 1968 to 
1996 and every other year since 1997.  The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 2210 
married women surveyed in the PSID between 1979 and 2007, for a total of 14303 
observations.
19  Up to four lags of endogenous variables were used as instruments, and 
therefore, the PSID waves used in the estimation sample range from 1983 to 2007 with 1982 
to 2006 as reference years. In addition to the PSID data directly available from the Survey 
Research Center, University of Michigan, the Cross-National Equivalent File for PSID 
(PSID-CNEF) available from the Department of Policy Analysis and Management at 
Cornell University were used to construct the key variables used in the paper  ((Burkhauser 
et al., 2001)).  
Measurement of Key Variables 
                                                 
18 Analogously,        
   ,the second lag of virtual net saving and time dummies are used as instruments in models 
applicable with linear capital income taxes and        
  ,      
   and time dummies are used as instruments in the 
static specifications, where      
    is constructed by replacing the actual marginal tax rate in     with the first 
dollar tax rate. 
19PSID collects most labor market information for the year before the survey year, so data 1979 to 2007 waves 
refer to years 1978 to 2006. Also since 1996, PSID surveyed individuals only once The main sample of PSID, 
i.e. excluding an oversample of low-income families, has 60368 observations on wives from 1979 and 2007. 
Restricting the age to 22-60 years olds resulted in 50675 observations. 14158 observations were dropped as 
wife or head was self-employed, head was a farmer, or household had own business, leaving 36517 
observations. Further, 234 person years were excluded as they were deemed outliers using multivariate outlier 
detection criteria. 5899 observations from 1979-1982 were dropped as the instrument consisted of 4
th lag of 
real asset. Finally 16089 person years were dropped due to missing data on one or more of the dependent 
variable, or the explanatory variables, or the instruments which consisted of 2
nd, 3
rd, and 4





The PSID contains more than one measure of the wage rate.  One measure can be 
formed by dividing annual real earnings by the annual hours worked.  This measure has 
been found in the literature to induce division bias in labor supply estimates, yielding 
parameter estimates inconsistent with theory (Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), Eklof and Sacklen 
(2000), Engelhardt and Kumar (2007)).  Following the Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), a self-
reported measure of wage is used, that does not require dividing annual labor income with 
annual hours, and is free of division bias. For hourly workers the hourly wage directly 
reported by workers was used. For salaried workers, the PSID asked the dollar amount they 
received in salary and the pay period i.e. once a month, twice a month, or weekly. Assuming 
that the salaried individual worked 40 hours a week, the dollar amount was divided by the 
respective number of hours worked during the pay period. Nominal hourly wages are then 
converted to real 2000 dollars by adjusting with the CPI (U). The log of real wage was used 
to estimate a selection-corrected wage equation to impute real wages for married women out 
of the labor force. 
Nonlabor Income and Assets 
  Nonlabor income is calculated as the sum of head’s labor income and the 
household’s asset income obtained from PSID-CNEF data. The method proposed in Ziliak 
and Kniesner (1999) was used to calculate the assets at the household level. First, liquid 
assets were calculated by capitalizing the first $200 of annual household asset income using 
the one month CD rate while the amount above $200 was capitalized using the 3-month 
treasury bill rate. Liquid assets were then added to home equity to calculate total household 
asset. Home equity was calculated as the difference between self reported value of the house  
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and the remaining mortgage and principal amount. The remaining mortgage and principal 
amount was not available for 1982; PSID-CNEF method was followed to impute the amount 
by adding half the difference between 1983 and 1981 value to the 1981 value. 
Taxes 
The adjusted gross income was calculated as the sum of household’s pre-government 
income and government transfer income both available from the PSID-CNEF data. The pre-
government income in PSID-CNEF is the sum of total family income from labor earnings, 
asset income, private transfers such as child support and alimony, and private pensions. 
Given the itemization status of the household from PSID, the dollar amount of itemized 
deduction was imputed as the average of itemized deduction for different categories of 
adjusted gross income from the NBER tax public use files obtained from IRS Statistics of 
Income. Information on year, filing status, number of dependents, number of age 
exemptions, household labor income, itemized deductions, and state was used to calculate 
the federal, state, and payroll tax rates and tax liabilities using the NBER-TAXSIM     
(Feenberg and Coutts (1993)). Federal, state, and payroll tax rates were then added to 
calculate the overall marginal tax rate for each individual, for each year. 
5.  Results from Panel Data Models with Censoring, Selection, and Endogeneity 
The paper estimates three types of elasticities: (1) participation elasticity using 
Probit/Logit type model (2) intensive margin elasticities using selection-corrected hours 
equation by restricting sample to labor force participants, and (3) Tobit-type models with 
censoring to estimate total hours elasticity. All three labor supply models are estimated 
using: (1) Pooled panel data model, (2) Fixed Effects (FE) model, and (3) Correlated 
Random Effects (CRE) model. Further, each model is estimated first without instrumental  
 
17
variables (IV) and with IV. The estimation details of various models are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
5.1 Participation Elasticities 
Table 2 presents marginal effects and elasticities on the extensive margin with 
respect to the three key variables in the lifecycle-consistent specification: after-tax wage, 
virtual lagged asset and current asset. The upper panel contains the marginal effects while 
the lower panel of each table presents the estimated elasticities.  Table 2 shows that IV 
estimates of marginal effects are larger than non-IV estimates. Among the three panel data 
models, FE-Logit-IV model yields the smallest elasticity of 0.43 compared with 0.56 from 
both the pooled panel and CRE-Probit-IV models, although, not statistically different..
20  
This pattern, however, does not apply to wealth elasticities as they are more or less 
similar across different models. Adding up the lagged and current assets elasticities yields a 
cumulative wealth elasticity of about -0.10 in both the pooled-Probit-IV and FE-Logit-IV 
specification and -0.14 in the CRE-Probit-IV specification.
21 
The estimated wage elasticities from the three panel data specifications with IV in 
columns (2), (4), and (6) are not precise enough to be statistically distinguishable. Indeed, a 
Hausman-type specification test on a subset of coefficients on key variables- after-tax wage, 
virtual lagged assets and current asset - had a p-value of 0.49 and failed to reject the CRE 
                                                 
20One limitation with fixed effects models is that average partial effects and therefore, elasticities are, in 
general, not identified, as the unobserved effects are not estimated (Wooldridge (2010), Abrevaya and Hsu 
(2011) Chernozhukov et al. (2009)). For the fixed effect logit, first the predicted probability of participating in 
the labor force was calculated conditional on a positive outcome for each individual. The mean of this 
predicted probability was used to calculate the adjustment factor for calculating marginal effects. Having 
calculated marginal effects, elasticities were calculated by multiplying with the ratio of mean wage to mean 
labor force participation. 
21Cumulative one period dynamic response has been calculated as suggested in Stock and Watson (2007).  
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Probit-IV model in column (6) vis-à-vis FE-Logit-IV model in column (4).
22 This is 
interpreted as evidence in favor of the CRE-Probit specification (Hausman (1978)). 
The instrumental variables have significant explanatory power in the first stage 
regressions for all the three endogenous variables - after-tax wage, lagged asset and current 
asset - as the p-values on a joint test of instruments were well below 0.05.  The p-values on 
the overidentification test, shown in the bottom panel, in columns (2) and (6) suggest that 
overidentification restrictions cannot be rejected, and therefore the instruments are valid. 
The p-value on the joint test of correlated random effect terms in column (6) indicates 
rejection of the hypothesis that, the terms controlling for correlation between the unobserved 
heterogeneity and the other model regressors are zero.  
5.2 Intensive Margin Elasticities 
The intensive margin results in Table 3 show a somewhat different pattern than those 
in Table 2 as they are more sensitive to unobserved effects specifications. The wage 
elasticity from the selection-corrected CRE-IV model in column (6) is about 44 percent 
smaller than the pooled-Heckman-IV results in column (2), although the confidence 
intervals around the estimates overlap. The estimated elasticity from instrumental variable 
semiparametric FE-IV model in column (4) is 0.35 and not statistically significant.  The 
wealth elasticities on the intensive margin are similar to extensive margin estimates, with the 
one period cumulative wealth elasticity in column (6) of -0.10. Assets elasticities from the 
semiparametric FE-IV model are not significant. Given the large difference in estimated 
                                                 
22The Hausman test can fail if the difference between variance-covariance matrices of the efficient and 
consistent specification may not be positive semidefinite.  A suggestion in (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2010) page 
331 is used  to calculate the Hausman  test statistic for only a subset of coefficients of primary interest, i.e. 
after-tax wage, virtual lagged asst and current asset.  
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elasticity between CRE-IV and FE-IV models, a Hausman-type specification test with a p-
value of 0.013 rejects the CRE-IV model in column (6) vis-à-vis the FE-IV model in column 
(4).  
5.3 Total Hours Elasticities from Tobit-type Models with Panel Data 
The overall hours elasticities obtained from the Tobit-type censored labor supply 
models presented in Table 4 show that semiparametric FE-IV estimates in column (4) are 
just about half of the CRE-Tobit-IV estimates in column (6).
23 Wage elasticities from CRE-
Tobit-IV are similar to pooled-Tobit-IV estimates in column (2). A Hausman-type 
specification test of CRE-Tobit-IV model in column (6) versus the fixed effects model in 
column (4), yielded a negative test statistic. The total wage elasticity from the CRE-Tobit-IV 
model in column (6) is 1 and the one period cumulative wealth elasticity is -0.16.  
5.4 Sensitivity to economic assumptions regarding lifecycle behavior and taxes 
By conditioning on lagged and current asset, labor supply models estimated in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 appropriately accounted for the realities of joint nonlinear taxation of 
labor and capital income taxation. How do these estimated elasticities compare with models 
that apply only to linear tax settings or to static models? Columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 5 
present estimated elasticities from models that condition on virtual net savings and, 
therefore, are consistent with assumptions of either no taxes or a linear capital income tax. 
Columns (7), (8), and (9) present results from static models of female labor supply estimated 
                                                 
23Marginal effects in the semiparametric fixed effects models for nonlinear panel data are, in general not 
identified. However, the marginal and elasticities for such models in the paper are calculated by simply treating 
the estimated coefficients as marginal effects.  
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in much of the previous literature using cross-section data. For comparison, columns (1), (2), 
and (3) reproduce participation elasticities from Table 2 and hours elasticities from Table 3. 
Estimated elasticities are somewhat sensitive to economic assumption of a static 
versus a lifecycle model. The CRE-Probit-IV estimate of the participation wage elasticity 
from the static model in column (9) is 0.46, smaller than 0.56 from the general lifecycle-
consistent model in column (3). The static model, however, yields a larger estimate of 
participation wage elasticity of 0.7 from the FE-Logit-IV model than the lifecycle-consistent 
estimate of 0.43. Wealth elasticities in columns (1)-(3) are significantly larger than 
responses due to increases in net savings from lifecycle model valid under linear taxes in 
columns (4)-(6), but not much different from income elasticities from static model in 
columns (7)-(9) 
The intensive margin wage elasticities, in the lower panel, show a much different 
pattern across the unobserved effects lifecycle-consistent and static models. Hours 
elasticities from fixed effects as well as CRE static models are less than half those from 
lifecycle consistent models and statistically insignificant.  
 Adding up the extensive and the intensive margins, lifecycle-consistent model with 
nonlinear taxes and nonseparable budget constraint yields an overall wage elasticity of 0.87 
from the CRE specification and 0.77 from the fixed effects model, although, the intensive 
margin elasticities are not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, overall wage 
elasticities from a model consistent with linear taxes and hence time-separable budget set are 
0.82 from the CRE and 0.59 from a fixed effects model. The static model produces an 
overall elasticity of 0.59 from the CRE and 0.86 from fixed effects. Figure 1 plots the 
estimated uncompensated and compensated wage elasticities from different IV models.   
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5.5 Robustness to Regressors and Alternative Instruments  
Tables 6 and 7 present results on robustness of lifecycle-consistent participation and 
hours elasticities to inclusion of regressors and to use of alternative instruments. Results are 
robust to controlling for a quadratic time trend in columns (3) and (4), and to accounting for 
spouse’s wage in columns (7) and (8). Controlling for the unemployment rate to account for 
business cycle effects in columns (5) and (6), however, yields markedly different results on 
participation elasticities in the upper panel compared with the baseline model in columns (1) 
and (2). Both participation elasticities and hours elasticties in the CRE model in column (6) 
are insignificant when unemployment rate is included. A possible explanation could be that 
the unemployment rate is mechanically correlated with participation and therefore an invalid 
control in the upper panel of column (6).  
  Table 7 examines robustness to alternative instruments. Columns (1) and (2) drop the 
time dummies from the baseline instrument set and use just the lags of the endogenous 
variables evaluated at the first dollar tax rate and. Columns (3) and (4) reproduce the pooled-
IV and CRE-IV results with the baseline set of instrumental variables from Tables 2 and 3 
that include time dummies as in Ziliak and Kniesner (1999). The p-values on 
overidentifying restrictions in columns (3) and (4) confirm that time dummies are indeed 
valid instruments.  
Columns (5) and (6) present results using groups formed by interaction of whether or 
not the individual had a high school diploma, year of birth category, and year as instruments 
similar in spirit to Blundell et al. (1998).
24  Columns (7) and (8) contain estimated 
                                                 
24Instruments were formed by interaction of 2 education groups, 4 year of birth groups, and 19 years.  
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elasticities using wage deciles by year groups as instruments, similar to Blau and Kahn 
(2007). The estimated participation elasticities are largely robust to use of alternative 
instruments. The point estimates of the intensive margin elasticity are substantially smaller 
from the CRE-IV specification in column (8) compared with those in columns (4) and (6). 
However, none of the elasticities in columns (4), (6), and (8) are statistically different from 
each other.  P-vlaues in the bottom panel indicate that overidentifying restrictions on 
education by cohort by year groups in columns (5) and (6) and on wage deciles by year 
groups in columns (7) and (8) are rejected.  
5.6 Implied Deadweight Loss and Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity 
Estimates of uncompensated wage and wealth elasticities from the lifecycle-
consistent specification can be used to calculate the deadweight loss from taxes and simulate 
the efficiency costs of tax policy. Adding up the wage elasticities on the participation and 
intensive margins, the overall wage elasticity from the CRE-IV specification is 0.87, while 
summing wealth elasticity on the two margins yields an estimate of -0.23. The implied 
compensated elasticity (  
      is 0.9.
25  
The well-known Harberger-Browning formula can then be used to simulate the 
increase in deadweight loss from changes in tax policy (Harberger (1964), Browning 
(1987)).
26 Allowing the Bush tax to expire for married women filing jointly with total 
                                                 
25The compensated elasticity on labor supply can be recovered using the formula   
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      ,     are the uncompensated wage, compensated wage, and wealth elasticity, 
respectively. As the married womens’ earnings relative to assets  
  
  
  0 . 1 9 , the compensated elasticity is 
0.64.  
26 Deadweight loss equals 
 
 
      
      
    ,  where  ,  is the marginal tax rate. This expression equals 0.028   if 
    0.25 and 0.034   if     0.27.  
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household earnings of $100,000 a year, for example, will lead to an increase in federal 
income tax rate from 25% to 27%. The implied deadweight loss would go up from 3.8% of 
earned income before the tax change to 4.6% after.
27   
The estimated elasticities can also be used to recover the  -constant elasticity- by 
using the formula        
             
   
  
  
 , where     is the intertemporal substitution 
elasticity (Browning (2005)). An estimate of the intertemporal substitution elasticity is 
needed to recover   . With    
   
  
  
    0.008,    is not much different from   
     for most 
plausible estimates of    . Using an estimated     of -0.69 from Blundell et al. (1993), the 
implied     for the lifecycle-consistent CRE specificationis 0.92, about the same as the 
compensated elasticity. 
5.7 Comparison with Elasticities of U.S. Married Women in the Previous Literature  
The uncompensated overall wage elasticity of 0.87 and 0.76 from the CRE-IV and 
fixed effects-IV models, respectively, although well within the range of estimates is similar 
to the median estimate of 0.7-0.8 reported in two major survey papers by  Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1986) and Blundell and Macurdy (1999). Estimated total labor supply elasticities 
are close to other papers using the PSID e.g. Hausman (1981), Hausman and Ruud (1984), 
and Triest (1990) who reported wage elasticities of 0.9, 0.76, and 1 respectively. The 
intensive margin elasticity of 0.30 from the CRE-IV model is very similar to Triest (1990). 
                                                 
27The calculation attempted here is at best a crude measure of deadweight loss from tax changes. Eissa et al. 
(2008) showed that the relevant tax rates for welfare cost calculations on the participation margins may be 
different. While the effective marginal tax is valid for the intensive margin, average rate is appropriate for the 
participation margin. Further, the calculation using labor supply elsticity ignores other margins of behavioral 
response i.e. effort, avoidance etc. A more comprehensive measure can be calculated using response on taxable 
income (Feldstein (1999), Saez et al. (2009)).   
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Elasticities in this paper are, however, substantially larger than from Mroz (1987) whose 
estimated married women’s elasticities using the 1975 PSID were not much different from 
prime age men’s. 
Using non-PSID datasets, papers such as Cogan (1981), Rosen (1976)), Heckman 
and Macurdy (1980), and Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) estimated total hours elasticities 
larger than 2. Estimated elasticities are closer to those in Eissa (1995) who, using the CPS, 
estimated a total hours elasticity of 0.8 for high income women with roughly half of it on the 
extensive margin. The estimated participation elasticity of 0.56 from the CRE-IV model is 
more than twice that of 0.27 found in Eissa and Hoynes (2004) while the intensive margin 
elasticity is larger than 0.2 reported in Devereux (2004). Both participation and intensive 
margin elasticities from the CRE specifications are within the range of those in Blau and 
Kahn (2007) who found that participation elasticities declined from 0.58 to 0.28 from 1980 
to 2000 while the hours elasticities dropped from 0.3 to 0.12. Heim (2009) also found a 
similar decline with participation elasticities declining from 0.2 to 0.1 and participation 
elasticities shrinking from 0.5 to 0. 
6. Conclusion 
Much of the previous literature on taxes and female labor supply in the U.S primarily 
estimated static models assuming myopic behavior and perfectly constrained capital 
markets. Estimates of within-period elasticities from purely static models are not lifecycle-
consistent and can be inaccurate if households can transfer assets across periods. Estimating 
lifecycle-consistent specification of female labor supply in a two-stage budgeting framework 
can also help recover intertemporal preferences in the presence of nonlinear taxes, when λ-
constant labor supply specifications are generally not valid. Despite their apparent  
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usefulness, lifecycle-consistent two-stage budgeting specifications incorporating nonlinear 
taxes have not been estimated for female labor supply in the U.S.  
This paper uses the PSID from 1979-2007 to estimate lifecycle-consistent labor 
supply elasticities of U.S. females with nonlinear taxes, in a two-stage budgeting 
framework. The paper is the first to estimate U.S. female labor supply models using 
semiparametric unobserved effects panel data methods with censoring, selection and 
endogeneity. The paper finds that female labor supply elasticities are sensitive to both the 
method used to account for unobserved effects and to economic assumptions regarding 
lifecycle behavior and taxes. Participation and hours wage elasticities are substantially 
smaller for unobserved effects panel data models compared with pooled panel models.  
The uncompensated wage elasticity from a lifecycle-consistent model with nonlinear 
taxes and nonseparable budget constraint, using CRE model with instrumental variables, is 
0.56 on the extensive margin and 0.31 on the intensive margin, implying an overall wage 
elasticity of 0.87; fixed effects model yields an overall wage elasticity of 0.76 compared 
with close to one from the pooled panel model. Overall wage elasticity from a model 
consistent with linear taxes and hence time-separable budget set are not much different. The 
static model, however, produces an overall elasticity of 0.58 from the CRE model and 0.85 
from fixed effects. 
Some important caveats apply to the results in the paper. First, like most previous 
studies on taxes and labor supply, this paper estimates a secondary earners model of female 
labor supply in a unitary rather than collective framework. Second, by linearizing the budget 
set and adopting an instrumental variables approach, the paper has sidestepped 
complications from modeling the entire budget set and ignored any biases due to  
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nonconvexities and fixed costs. Third, the estimated elasticities may be downward-biased as 
the paper does not account for human capital accumulation (Keane (2011), Imai and Keane 
(2004)). The model also does not account for optimization frictions which could cause 
observed elasticities to be different from their structural estimates (Chetty (2009)). And 
finally, marriage and fertility have been assumed to be exogenous. Addressing these features 
in the context of a lifecycle-consistent female labor supply model with nonlinear taxes using 
panel data is left to future research. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
1983-85  1986-89 1990-94 1995-99 2001-05 Overall 
Annual  Hours  1015.0  1114.8 1188.1 1311.0 1385.5 1187.3 
(882.1) (875.8)  (873.8)  (891.5) (895.3) (889.4) 
[1062]  [1314]  [1460] [1613.4] [1716]  [1444] 
Labor Force 
Participat’n    0.698  0.730 0.760 0.797 0.809 0.755 
(0.459) (0.444)  (0.427)  (0.402) (0.393) (0.430) 
[1]  [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] 
Real Gross Wage   11.59  12.27 12.33 12.95 14.30 12.56 
  (4.494) (5.293)  (6.328)  (6.976) (6.782) (6.047) 
  [10.67] [11.06]  [10.80]  [11.02] [12.88] [11.11] 
Real Net Wage   7.531  8.349 8.482 8.741 9.695 8.494 
  (2.647) (3.396)  (4.078)  (4.470) (4.303) (3.862) 
  [7.011] [7.638]  [7.627]  [7.597] [8.852] [7.633] 
First Dollar 
Predicted   11.59  12.79 13.27 15.43 17.57 13.80 
Net Wage  (2.840) (3.504)  (4.267)  (5.357) (5.488) (4.682) 
  [11.11] [12.05]  [12.27]  [14.23] [16.38] [12.71] 
Marginal Tax Rate  0.341  0.311 0.303 0.316 0.312 0.315 
  (0.0761) (0.0687)  (0.0664)  (0.0686) (0.0814) (0.0724) 
  [0.347] [0.313]  [0.305]  [0.320] [0.317] [0.319] 
First Dollar Tax Rate  -0.0325 -0.0580  -0.122 -0.311 -0.337 -0.151 
  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.056)  (0.027) (0.033) (0.122) 
  [-0.033] [-0.064]  [-0.108]  [-0.324] [-0.324] [-0.093] 
Real AGI   66.86  72.18  70.65 78.302.3 83.66  73.33 
  (36.07) (40.43)  (39.12)  (44.27) (47.26) (41.31) 
  [62.94] [66.09]  [63.89]  [70.97] [77.23] [66.73] 
Real Nonlabor   47.44  48.89 47.44 52.20 53.33 49.33 
Income  (32.56) (34.66)  (33.54)  (36.69) (39.55) (35.09) 
  [44.94] [45.15]  [43.04]  [45.76] [45.62] [44.71] 
Virtual Real 
Nonlabor   52.73  52.68 49.78 54.98 56.07 52.64 
Income  (37.62) (38.89)  (35.79)  (39.12) (41.67) (38.27) 
  [49.02] [47.24]  [44.65]  [47.80] [46.70] [46.74] 
Real Asset  76.92  82.20 72.58 73.71 88.68 78.00 
  (78.27) (97.46)  (85.22)  (78.11) (129.9) (93.74) 
  [64.23] [58.08]  [48.65]  [52.82] [62.15] [55.57] 
Virtual Real Lagged   138.3  137.2 127.6 125.0 165.9 136.7 
Asset  (134.1) (159.8)  (146.5)  (123.3) (336.9) (184.4)  
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  [105.7] [96.01]  [92.61]  [102.4] [116.5] [100.7] 
Age  43.53  43.49 42.82 43.23 44.83 43.45 
  (10.03) (9.943)  (9.312)  (8.805) (8.060) (9.372) 
  [43] [43]  [42]  [43] [44] [43] 
White  0.905  0.904 0.918 0.933 0.925 0.916 
(0.293) (0.294)  (0.275)  (0.251) (0.264) (0.278) 
[1]  [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] 
Years of Education  12.32  12.64  12.87  13.14  13.41  12.84 
(2.133) (2.235)  (2.199)  (2.163) (2.233) (2.221) 
[12] [12]  [12]  [12] [13] [12] 
Less Than High 
School  0.199 0.164  0.140  0.109  0.0806  0.143 
(0.400) (0.370)  (0.347)  (0.312) (0.272) (0.350) 
[0]  [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
Highschool  0.528  0.494 0.451 0.429 0.382 0.461 
(0.499) (0.500)  (0.498)  (0.495) (0.486) (0.499) 
[1]  [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
Some  College  0.144  0.184 0.231 0.254 0.282 0.216 
(0.351) (0.388)  (0.421)  (0.436) (0.450) (0.411) 
[0]  [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
College  0.129  0.158 0.178 0.207 0.255 0.180 
(0.335) (0.365)  (0.382)  (0.406) (0.436) (0.384) 
[0]  [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
Number  of  Children 1.173  1.075 1.114 1.059 1.185 1.117 
(1.227) (1.174)  (1.127)  (1.130) (1.158) (1.162) 
[1]  [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] 
Poor  Health  0.146  0.155 0.152 0.143 0.117 0.145 
(0.353) (0.362)  (0.359)  (0.351) (0.321) (0.352) 
[0]  [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 
Owns  Home  0.883  0.859 0.853 0.929 0.926 0.882 
(0.322) (0.348)  (0.354)  (0.257) (0.261) (0.323) 
[1]  [1] [1] [1] [1] [1] 
Note: Summary statistics are based on the estimation sample of 14303 observations. The sample starts on 1983 as up to 
four lags of endogenous variables were used as instruments. For all variables standard deviation is in parenthesis, median is 
prsented in brackets. All the dollar variables are in real 2000 $. Gross Wage and After Tax Wage for non-workers is based 
on the predicted wage. 
 
  
Table 2: Lifecycle-Consistent Participation Elasticities For Married Women From The PSID (1983-2007) 
(Dependent Variable: Labor Force Participation Dummy) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















Marginal Effects        
After-Tax Wage  0.011** 0.050**  -0.002  0.038** 0.010** 0.050** 
  (0.002) (0.012) (0.004) (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) 
Virtual Lagged Asset  0.000**  -0.000*  0.000 -0.000**  0.000* -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Current Asset  -0.000** -0.001**  0.000  -0.001*  -0.000** -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Elasticities        
After-Tax Wage  0.123** 0.556**  -0.023  0.426** 0.114** 0.563** 
  (0.019) (0.137) (0.048) (0.163) (0.019) (0.171) 
Virtual Lagged Asset  0.010**  -0.028*  0.003 -0.043**  0.010* -0.037* 
  (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.021) (0.005) (0.021) 
Current Asset  -0.035** -0.066**  0.000  -0.052*  -0.039** -0.096** 
  (0.008) (0.018) (0.002) (0.029) (0.008) (0.040) 
P-value on Overid Test   0.784      0.859 
P-val on Corr Random Eff          0.000  0.000 
Pseudo  R-Sq  0.081 0.083 0.102 0.106 0.091 0.094 
Observations  14303  14303 5652  5652 14303  14303 
Note: The dependent variable is Labor Force Participation (LFP) dummy. CRE estimates in columns (5) and (6) were obtained using method in Papke and 
Wooldridge (2008). All marginal Effects and elasticities computed at the mean LFP of 0.79,  mean net wage of 8.82/hour, mean asset of 73.32 (in ‘000), 
and mean lagged virtual asset of 140.88 (in ‘000). Bootstrapped standard errors using 100 replications and clustered at the individual level are reported in 
parenthesis. In addition to the variables listed in the table, other explanatory variables included in all specifications are quartic in age, number of children, 
dummy for children less than 7 years, and dummy for self-reported health status. The endogenous variables are after tax real wage, virtual lagged real asset 
and current year real asset. The instruments are the second lag of after tax predicted real wage, the second lag of virtual lagged real asset, the fourth lag of 
current real asset and a set of time dummies. Unobserved after-tax real wage for non-labor-force-participating females was replaced by wage imputed using 
a year-specific selection corrected wage regression on a quartic in age and education, race dummies,and state dummies. To estimate the wage equation, the 
first-step selection equation controlled for everything in the wage equation plus real nonlabor income, number of children and a dummy for children. less 
than 7 years. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05.  
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Table 3: Selection-Corrected Lifecycle-Consistent Hours Elasticities for Married Women from the PSID (1983-2007) 
(Dependent Variable: Annual Hours Of Work) 





















Marginal Effects        
After-Tax Wage  11.776** 99.107**  -8.978  61.031  23.931**  55.202* 
  (3.878)  (46.741) (46.978) (53.969)  (4.279)  (32.300) 
Virtual Lagged Asset  0.063 0.156 0.188 0.509  0.179**  0.151 
  (0.063) (0.169) (0.454) (0.731) (0.064) (0.352) 
Current Asset  -0.658** -2.248**  0.303  0.008  -0.688** -2.612** 
  (0.193) (0.694) (0.694) (2.402) (0.136) (0.983) 
Elasticities        
After-Tax Wage  0.065** 0.549**  -0.050  0.338  0.133**  0.306* 
  (0.021) (0.259) (0.260) (0.299) (0.024) (0.179) 
Virtual Lagged Asset  0.005 0.013 0.001 0.003  0.015**  0.013 
  (0.005) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.029) 
Current Asset  -0.028** -0.097**  0.002  0.000  -0.030** -0.112** 
  (0.008) (0.030) (0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.042) 
P-value on Overid Test   0.013  0.990  0.008 
P-val on Corr Random Eff          0.000  0.000 
R-Sq  0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.06 
Observations  10998  10998 6515  7156 10998  10998 
Note: The dependent variable is annual hours of work.  Semiparametric Fixed Effects estimates in columns (3) and (4) used method in Kyriazidou (1997). CRE 
estimates in columns (5) and (6) were obtained using method in Semykina and Wooldridge (2010).  All marginal Effects and elasticities computed at the 
mean hours for labor force participants of 1589, mean net wage of 9.05/hour, mean asset of 70.81 (in ‘000), and mean lagged virtual asset of 141.40 (in ‘000). 
Bootstrapped standard errors using 100 replications and clustered at the individual level are reported in parenthesis. The endogenous variables are after tax real 
wage, virtual lagged real asset and current year real asset. The instruments are the second lag of after tax predicted real wage, the second lag of virtual lagged 
real asset, the fourth lag of current real asset and a set of time dummies. To obtain the inverse mills ratio, the first step reduced form LFP equation was 
estimated on the instruments, quartic in age, number of children, dummy for children less than 7 years , and dummy for self-reported health status.   The 
exclusion restriction for the second step selection-corrected hours equation was dummy for children less than 7 years. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05   
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Table 4: Lifecycle-Consistent Total Labor Supply Elasticities for Married Women from the PSID (1983-2007) 
(Dependent Variable: Annual Hours of Work) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
















Marginal Effects        
After-Tax Wage  34.722** 169.506** -10.302** 69.476**  32.935** 141.465** 
  (3.667) (43.680) (4.462) (22.181) (3.824) (45.184) 
Virtual Lagged Asset  0.211** -0.277 0.214**  -0.403*  0.201** -0.182 
  (0.085) (0.206) (0.078) (0.236) (0.083) (0.241) 
Current Asset  -1.437** -3.077**  -0.167  -1.663** -1.518** -2.480** 
  (0.203) (0.668) (0.154) (0.843) (0.205) (1.038) 
Elasticities        
After-Tax Wage  0.245** 1.195** -0.073** 0.490** 0.232** 0.997** 
  (0.026) (0.308) (0.031) (0.156) (0.027) (0.319) 
Virtual Lagged Asset  0.023** -0.030 0.023**  -0.043*  0.022** -0.020 
  (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) (0.025) (0.009) (0.026) 
Current Asset  -0.083** -0.178**  -0.010  -0.096** -0.088** -0.144** 
  (0.012) (0.039) (0.009) (0.049) (0.012) (0.060) 
P-value on Overid Test    0.756      0.675 
P-val on Corr Random Eff          0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.010  0.011      0.012  0.012 
Observations  14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 
Note: The dependent variable is annual hours of work. Semiparametric Fixed Effects estimates in columns (3) and (4) used method in Honoré (1992). CRE 
estimates in columns (5) and (6) were obtained using method in Papke and Wooldridge (2008)   All marginal Effects and elasticities computed at the mean 
hours  of 1156,  mean net wage of 8.82/hour, mean asset of 73.32 (in ‘000), and mean lagged virtual asset of 140.88 (in ‘000). Bootstrapped standard errors 
using 100 replications and clustered at the individual level are reported in parenthesis. In addition to the variables listed in the table, other explanatory 
variables included in all specifications are quartic in age, number of children, dummy for children less than 7 years, and dummy for self-reported health 
status. The endogenous variables are after tax real wage, virtual lagged real asset and current year real asset. The instruments are the second lag of after tax 
predicted real wage, the second lag of virtual lagged real asset, the fourth lag of current real asset and a set of time dummies. Unobserved after-tax real wage 
for non-labor-force-participating females was replaced by wage imputed using a year-specific selection corrected wage regression on a quartic in age and 
education, race dummies,and state dummies. To estimate the wage equation, the first-step selection equation controlled for everything in the wage equation 
plus real nonlabor income, number of children and a dummy for children less than 7 years. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05  
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Table 5: Sensitivity of Estimated Labor Supply Elasticities to Taxes and Lifecycle-specifications  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Lifecycle Model With  
Nonlinear Taxes 
Lifecycle Model With  
Linear Taxes 
Static Model  
With Taxes 



















Participation Elasticity              
After-Tax Wage  0.556** 0.426** 0.563** 0.590** 0.444** 0.531**  0.534** 0.697**  0.457** 
  (0.137) (0.163) (0.171) (0.188) (0.089) (0.160) (0.123)  (0.118)  (0.146) 
Lagged Virtual Assets  -0.028* -0.043** -0.037*          
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)          
Current Assets  -0.066** -0.052* -0.096**          
  (0.018) (0.029) (0.040)          
Virtual Net Saving        -0.004 -0.002**  -0.005**     
       (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)     
Virtual Income               -0.187** -0.119** -0.056 
             (0.030) (0.038) (0.068) 
Hours Elasticity              
After-Tax Wage  0.549** 0.338  0.306* 0.523*  0.147 0.290**  0.579** 0.157  0.127 
  (0.259) (0.299) (0.179) (0.289) (0.239) (0.147) (0.235)  (0.256)  (0.196) 
Lagged Virtual Assets  0.013 0.003 0.013          
  (0.014) (0.004) (0.029)          
Current Assets  -0.097** 0.000 -0.112**          
  (0.030) (0.013) (0.042)          
Virtual Net Saving        0.002 0.004 -0.002     
       (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)     
Virtual Income            -0.153**  -0.008  -0.135* 
           (0.054)  (0.035)  (0.072) 
P-value Overid Test   0.784   0.859  0.705   0.729  0.186   0.213 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.083 0.106 0.094 0.079  0.102 0.088  0.095  0.102 0.111  
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Observations  14303 14303 14303  14199  5597 14199  14303 14303  14303 
Note: The dependent variable is Labor Force Participation (LFP) dummy for participation elasticity in the upper panel and annual hours of work for hours 
elasticity conditional on participation in the lower panel.  Bootstrapped standard errors using 100 replications and clustered at the individual level are reported 
in parenthesis. See note to Table 2 for details of variables for the participation elasticity in columns (1) and (2) of the upper panel. See notes to Table 3 for 
details of variables for the selection corrected hours equation to estimate the hours elasticity in columns (1) and (2) of the lower panel. All the non-endogenous 
explanatory variables are the same as in Tables 2, 3, 4. For the estimates in columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9), after-tax wage variable is the same but lagged virtual 
assets and real assets are replaced by virtual net savings or virtual nonlabor income and corresponding instruments replaced by the second lags of virtual net 
savings or virtual nonlabor income calculated at the first dollar tax rate. For calculating the elasticities, means of virtual net saving is 6.48 in the upper panel 
and 6.67 in the lower panel and virtual income used is 55.21 in upper panel and 53.9 in the lower panel, all in ‘000. See note to Tables 2 and 3 for means of 
other relevant variables. Unobserved after-tax real wage for non-labor-force-participating females for estimation of participation elasticities was replaced by 
wage imputed using a year-specific selection corrected wage regression on a quartic in age and education, race dummies,and state dummies. Real nonlabor 
income, number of children and a dummy for children. less than 7 years used as exclusion restriction to identify wage equation. The exclusion restriction for 
the second step selection-corrected hours equation to calculate hours elasticity in the lower panel was dummy for children less than 7 years.  * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity of Estimated Lifecycle-Consistent Elasticities To Regressors  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation  Pooled IV   Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Pooled IV  Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Pooled IV  Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Pooled IV  Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Participation Elasticity          
After-Tax Wage  0.556** 0.563** 0.470** 0.574**  0.187  0.123  0.566** 0.489** 
  (0.137) (0.171) (0.141) (0.166) (0.117) (0.150) (0.146) (0.171) 
Lagged Virtual Assets  -0.028* -0.037* -0.026* -0.040*  0.005  -0.021  -0.019  -0.034 
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) 
Current Assets  -0.066** -0.096** -0.057** -0.106** -0.046** -0.086** -0.051** -0.083** 
  (0.018) (0.040) (0.018) (0.041) (0.017) (0.039) (0.016) (0.039) 
Hours Elasticity          
After-Tax Wage  0.549** 0.306* 0.497** 0.328*  0.358*  0.243  0.632**  0.211 
  (0.259) (0.179) (0.244) (0.181) (0.203) (0.150) (0.233) (0.208) 
Lagged Virtual Assets  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.007  0.027*  0.032  0.038**  0.022 
  (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.031) (0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.026) 
Current Assets  -0.097** -0.112** -0.091** -0.115** -0.088** -0.105** -0.042**  -0.062 
  (0.030) (0.042) (0.028) (0.040) (0.022) (0.039) (0.020) (0.038) 
Quadratic Time Trend  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Unemployment  Rate    No No No No Yes  Yes No No 
Spouse’s  Wage  No No No No No No Yes  Yes 
P-value on Overid Test  0.784  0.859  0.855  0.795  0.468  0.748  0.491  0.468 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.083 0.094 0.084  0.095  0.088  0.102  0.091  0.123 
Observations  14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 
Note: The dependent variable is Labor Force Participation (LFP) dummy for participation elasticity in the upper panel and annual hours of work for hours 
elasticity conditional on participation in the lower panel.  Bootstrapped standard errors using 100 replications and clustered at the individual level are reported 
in parenthesis. Columns (1) and (2) contain results from the baseline model. See note to Table 2 for details of variables for the participation elasticity in the 
upper panel. See notes to Table 3 for details of variables for the selection corrected hours equation to estimate the hours elasticity in the lower panel. All the 
non-endogenous explanatory variables are the same as in Tables 2 and 3. See note to Tables 2 and 3 for means of relevant variables for calculation of 
elasticities. Unobserved after-tax real wage for non-labor-force-participating females for estimation of participation elasticities was replaced by wage imputed 
using a year-specific selection corrected wage regression on a quartic in age and education, race dummies,and state dummies. Real nonlabor income, number 
of children and a dummy for children. less than 7 years used as exclusion restriction to identify wage equation. The exclusion restriction for the second step 
selection-corrected hours equation to calculate hours elasticity in the lower panel was dummy for children less than 7 years.   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05.  
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Table 7: Sensitivity of Estimated Lifecycle-Consistent Elasticities to Alternative Instruments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Pooled IV  Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Pooled IV   Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Pooled IV  Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Pooled IV  Corr. 
Random 
Effects IV 
Participation Elasticity          
After-Tax Wage  -3.535  1.888  0.556** 0.563** 0.349** 0.343** -0.173* -0.353** 
  (45.217) (14.392)  (0.137)  (0.171)  (0.063) (0.102) (0.092) (0.107) 
Lagged Virtual Assets  -1.207 -0.781  -0.028*  -0.037*  -0.054**  -0.071**  0.850**  1.170** 
  (13.005) (11.139)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.023) (0.030) (0.216) (0.231) 
Current Assets  1.328 0.336  -0.066**  -0.096**  -0.021  -0.080*  -0.674**  -0.493** 
  (8.869) (6.834) (0.018) (0.040) (0.018) (0.043) (0.159) (0.213) 
Hours Elasticity          
After-Tax Wage  0.979 -0.124  0.549**  0.306*  -0.053 0.241  0.209**  0.098** 
  (3.021) (1.846) (0.259) (0.179) (0.052) (0.190) (0.050) (0.029) 
Lagged Virtual Assets  0.358 -0.070 0.013 0.013  0.050**  -0.011 -0.169 -0.042 
  (0.555) (0.795) (0.014) (0.029) (0.017) (0.047) (0.128) (0.094) 
Current Assets  -0.410  -0.020  -0.097** -0.112** -0.063**  -0.035  0.064  -0.077 
  (0.400) (0.522) (0.030) (0.042) (0.016) (0.043) (0.096) (0.058) 
Instrument Used          
2
nd Lag of Net Wage Based 
on first dollar tax rate,  
virtual income/asset  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  Dummies  No No Yes  Yes No No No No 
Education  X  Year  Groups  No No No No Yes  Yes No No 
Wage  Decile  X  Year  No No No No No No Yes  Yes 
P-value on Overid Test      0.784  0.859  0.002  0.014  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.081  0.093  0.083 0.094 0.083  0.094  0.093  0.112 
Observations  14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 14303 
Note: The dependent variable is Labor Force Participation (LFP) dummy for participation elasticity in the upper panel and annual hours of work for hours elasticity 
conditional on participation in the lower panel.  Bootstrapped standard errors using 100 replications and clustered at the individual level are reported in parenthesis. See 
note to Table 2 for details of variables for the participation elasticity in columns (1) and (2) of the upper panel. See notes to Table 3 for details of variables for the 
selection corrected hours equation to estimate the hours elasticity in columns (1) and (2) of the lower panel. All the non-endogenous explanatory variables are the same as  
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in Tables 2 and 3. See note to Tables 2 and 3 for means of relevant variables for calculation of elasticities. Unobserved after-tax real wage for non-labor-force-
participating females for estimation of participation elasticities was replaced by wage imputed using a year-specific selection corrected wage regression on a quartic in age 
and education, race dummies,and state dummies. Real nonlabor income, number of children and a dummy for children. less than 7 years used as exclusion restriction to 
identify wage equation. The exclusion restriction for the second step selection-corrected hours equation to calculate hours elasticity in the lower panel was dummy for 
children less than 7 years.   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05. 





Note: Overall uncompensated wage elasticity is the sum of elasticity on the extensive and intensive margin from Table 5. Compensated elasticities calculated 
at overall mean real after-tax wage of $8.69, mean hours of 1188, mean current assets of 80760, mean virtual real net saving of $6480, and mean real virtual 













































Pooled Panel Correlated RandomEffects Fixed Effects 
Appendix 1: Estimation Details 
Pooled Panel Data Models  
 As a benchmark for comparison with models with unobserved effects, the paper first 
estimates simple pooled panel data models assuming that the dual error term          is a 
normally distributed random error that is uncorrelated with other regressors. The selection-
corrected version of (7) on pooled data is estimated using a Heckman-type framework with 
inverse mills ratio from a first step labor force participation equation (Heckman (1979)). 
Endogeneity of    ,      
  , and     is addressed using conventional two-stage procedure. 
Estimates from pooled models will be biased if any of the right hand side variables are 
correlated with   . An option is to use a first-differencing or fixed effects specification. 
Fixed Effect Models  
Tobit-type Labor Supply Models with Fixed Effects  
Nonlinear panel data models with censoring do not lend themselves to conventional 
fixed effects or first-differenced methods. To account for both censoring and fixed effects, 
the paper employs a semiparametric fixed effect estimator from Honoré (1992) who 
proposed a trimming mechanism to restore the symmetry of the error distribution affected by 
censoring or truncation, followed by least squares or least absolute deviation estimation.
28 
Assuming that the errors in a pair of years, say   and   1  are identically and independently 
distributed, the trimmed data can then be used to difference away the individual specific 
effects (Honoré (2002), Arellano and Honore (2001), Chay and Powell (2001).
 29  
                                                 
28 This is analogous to the method proposed in Powell (1986). 
29 Another alternative is to estimate bias-corrected estimates of Tobit with fixed effects suggested by Hahn and 
Newey (2004).  
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Although, this method accounts for correlation between right hand side variables and 
unobserved effect, parameter estimates will still be biased if endogenous variables,ω  , 
A    
  , and A  are correlated with the time varying error term     calling for an instrumental 
variables approach.
30 The control function method proposed in Blundell and Powell (2007)  
is combined with the semiparametric fixed effects method in (Bo E. Honoré, 1992) to deal 
with endogeneity.
31  
Labor Force Participation Models with Fixed Effects  
Parameters of labor force participation equation are consistently estimated using 
fixed effects Logit models (Andersen (1970), Chamberlain (1982)).  Endogeneity is 
corrected by extending the control function approach proposed in Blundell and Powell 
(2007), similar to the semiparametric censored model above.  
Panel Selection-Corrected Hours Equations with Fixed Effects 
This paper follows the selection-correction set-up in Heim (2009), except that the 
model incorporates individual specific fixed effects in both the selection equation and the 
hours equation. The selection equation is a fixed effects version of (8): 
   
                     ,  (10)
where    are individual specific unobserved effects. The second step selection-corrected 
hours equation conditional on labor force participation can be written as:  
                                  
                
                       (11)
                                                 
30 The paper uses the code available from Honore’s website to estimate semiparametric fixed effects models 
with censoring. 
31 A vector of residuals,            
   ,    
   ,    
     
 
 , from the first stage linear fixed effects regressions of each of 
the endogenous variables    ,      
  , and     on instruments        
  ,     
   ,           and other exogenous 
variables     is included in the model.  
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where                 is the inverse mills ratio obtained from the first step. Although, 
individual specific effects    can be eliminated by differencing,    enters the equation 
nonlinearly through the inverse mills ratio and cannot be eliminated by differencing.  
The paper applies a semiparametric selection correction method proposed in 
Kyriazidou (1997). First, parameters      of the selection equation (10) are estimated using a 
consistent estimator e.g. fixed effect Logit. Then for any two time periods,   1  and   in 
which the female participates in the labor force, if  Δ   
             
        then first differencing 
(11) would difference away not only    but also    and      
      . Because    
  has both 
continuous and discrete elements, Δ   
      is unlikely to equal zero. However, estimation can 
be restricted to observations for which, Δ   
      is small. Better still, using all observations 
and estimating the following weighted least squares equation for labor force participants 
with weights going to zero if  |Δ   
 | increases, yields consistent estimates: 
ξ  Δ        ξ  Δ        ξ  Δ        ξ  Δ     
   ξ  Δ     ξ  Δ   ,  (12)




        
 
  
  is a kernel weight function with h , the bandwidth.  
Endogeneity in (12) is dealt with following a straightforward application of the two-
stage procedure adopted in Charlier et al. (2001) with Δ       
  ,Δ     
   ,    Δ       used as 
instruments.  
Semiparametric fixed effects methods solve the problem of correlated unobserved 
heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and nonnormality of the error distributions. However, an 
important limitation is that average partial effects and therefore, elasticities are, in general, 
not identified, as the unobserved effects are not estimated Wooldridge (2010).  Papke and  
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Wooldridge (2008) and Wooldridge (2009) showed that estimating average partial effects is 
feasible in a correlated random effects framework. 
Correlated Random Effects (CRE) Tobit and Probit Models 
Letting    be a linear function of time means of      ,    ,      
  ,        , so that 
                                                           and substituting in (7) yields the CRE 
specification, 
   
                                
                                                          ,   (13)
 
Assuming strict exogeneity and normality of the composite error term                (13) is 
estimated using a Probit or a Tobit.
32  
Control function approach proposed in Papke and Wooldridge (2008) and 
Wooldridge (2009) is used to account for endogeneity. Letting    , represent the exogenous 
variables in the model and     , the instruments         
  ,     
   ,           , so that      
    ,        represents the vector of all exogenous variables and instruments. Also let 
   ,    ,       be the time means of all exogenous variables, included exogenous variables, and 
excluded instruments, respectively. The first stage in (13) consists of regressing each 
endogenous variable,    ,    ,      
  , on     and     and getting the vector of residuals 
                                                 
32Typically such CRE specifications are applicable only for balanced panels. However, following Wooldridge 
(2009), CRE can be adapted for unbalanced panels by assuming that in addition to strict exogeneity of 
covariates selection into the panel is also strictly exogenous i.e. dropping out of the panel is not systematically 
correlated with    .  
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   ,    
   ,    
     
 
 . In the second stage, hours or labor force participation is regressed on 
   ,    ,      
  ,    ,   ,    
   ,    
   ,    




Correlated Random Effect Models with Selection Correction  
  Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) proposed a parametric method to account for 
correlated individual effects in the selection equation (10) as well as the main equation (11), 
which combines the typical Heckman-type selectivity correction with correlated random 
effects models similar in spirit to (13).  In the specification without endogeneity, in the first 
step, year-specific inverse mills ratio,    
   are obtained by running a Probit of    
    on    
  
and    
 
  for each  . In the second step, the specification in (13) is augmented with     
    
∑           
  
 
    .  
To account for endogeneity, Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) proposed 2SLS 
estimation similar in spirit to Papke and Wooldridge (2008) and Wooldridge (2009). In the 
first step a Heckman-type selection equation is estimated by running a reduced form Probit 
of labor force participation on     and an exclusion restriction       7 for each year 
separately and the year-specific inverse mills ratio for each labor force participant,    , 
saved.  In the second step hours is regressed on    ,    ,      
  ,    ,   ,   
  ,          
   in a 2sls 
framework treating    ,    ,      
   as endogenous. 
 
                                                 
33 Note that time means of endogenous variables are not included in the second stage CRE specification. 
Instead the time means of exogenous variables     and instruments       are included. 